
















I IS SE ET T  WORKING PAPER SERIES 
 
 Do Immigrants A⁄ect Labor Market Disparities?




This study exploits the natural experiment, provided by the start of the second
intifada, to measure the e⁄ect of immigration on labor market outcomes of Israeli-
Arabs and Jews. It ￿nds that Immigrants of di⁄erent origins, Palestinians versus
Foreigners, have di⁄erent e⁄ects on the labor market, and these e⁄ects are experienced
di⁄erently by di⁄erent native groups, suggesting that the degree of substitution with
native workers varies between groups. More speci￿cally, a 10% foreign-worker-induced
increase in the supply in a particular industry reduces the wage of Arabs by about
1%, while having no e⁄ect on Jewish wages. Palestinian-induced increase in the supply
in a particular industry, in contrast, has the opposite e⁄ect: it reduces the wage of
Jewish workers by about 1% but increases the wage of Arabs by 2.5%. Employment
opportunities of either Arabs or Jews are not signi￿cantly a⁄ected by foreign workers,
but are harmed by Palestinian in￿ uxes (in the scale of 1.5% for Arabs and 0.5% for
Jews, for a 10% Palestinian-induced increase in the supply in a particular industry).
Simulation analyses show that immigration of Palestinians and foreign workers together
explain 7.6% of the increase in the wage gap between Israeli Arabs and Jews in the
1990s. They provide no explanation for changes in the employment gap.
￿This study is based on the main chapter of my dissertation. I am indebted to Janet Currie, Brendan
O￿ Flaherty, and Nachum Sicherman for their support and guidance. I greatly bene￿ted from insightful
discussions with Ronald Findlay, David S. Lee, Phoebus J. Dhrymes, Lena Edlund, Edward Vytlacil, Miguel
Urquiola, Till von Wachter, and Alexei Onatski. Thanks also go to seminar participants at Columbia
University, Tel Aviv University, Ben Gurion University, The University of Tennessee, Monash University
(Australia), and Union College for helpful comments. All remaining errors are my own.
11 Introduction
On September 30, 2000 the second intifada erupted.1 The number of Palestinians employed
in Israel, consequently, dropped by 84,000 workers (about 7% of the Israeli, male workforce).
This study uses this natural experiment to study the e⁄ect of immigration on labor market
outcomes of natives (Israeli Arabs and Jews). In doing so it uses border closures as an
instrument for the number of Palestinian workers in Israel, and the number of ￿worker
permits￿ ￿ utilizing slack enforcement and ine¢ ciencies in their issuance￿ as an instrument
for the number of foreign guest workers in Israel.
Many studies attempt to estimate the e⁄ects of immigration on the labor market outcomes
of disadvantaged groups in the US economy (Card (1990); Altonji and Card (1991); Borjas
(2003); and Borjas et al. (2006)). The evidence is inconclusive, and at times contradictory
(Card (2001); Borjas (2003)), but most previous estimates suggest that the e⁄ects are small
(Friedberg and Hunt (1995)). Many of the earlier studies, however, focus on the correlation
between labor market outcomes in a locality and the extent of immigrant penetration in that
locality.2 This method may produce confusing evidence of the e⁄ects of immigration on the
labor market, since the e⁄ects are likely to be di⁄used throughout the national economy by
the internal migration of natives (Borjas (1999)).
Moreover, some of these studies treat immigration as exogenous, possibly producing
1￿[intifada:]... an armed uprising of Palestinians against Israeli occupation of the West Bank and Gaza
Strip...￿Merriam-Webster￿ s Online Dictionary <http://www.m-w.com>.
2Also referred to as ￿Spatial Analyses￿studies.
2biased estimates of the e⁄ect.3 Also, the origin of immigrants in these studies is not controlled
for, while it is possible that heterogeneity of groups of immigrants yields heterogeneous e⁄ects
on the labor market. Finally, immigrant in￿ ows to the US are relatively small. Would large,
sharp shocks to the immigrant stock produce similar e⁄ects?
The Israeli economy in the 1990s and the early 2000s makes an interesting case for
studying the e⁄ect of immigration on labor market outcomes of, and disparities between,
native groups. First, in this period there were large and rapid changes in the wage and
employment gaps between Israeli Arabs and Jews in the Israeli labor market.4 Second, Israel
being a small state￿ slightly smaller than New Jersey￿ e⁄ects are almost always studied on
a ￿national￿basis, therefore internal migration does not impose di¢ culties in measuring the
e⁄ect of immigration. Finally, the number of immigrant workers￿ Palestinians and foreign
guest workers￿ was increasing in this period, and a great portion of the variation in their
numbers was the result of the intifada and security-based border closures between Israel and
the West Bank and Gaza Strip.5
I ￿nd that immigrants of di⁄erent origins have di⁄erent e⁄ects on the labor market. These
3Clear exceptions to this generalization include Card (1990), Hunt (1992), and Friedberg (2001), to name
but some. Theses studies use ￿natural experiments￿to measure the e⁄ect of immigration on labor market
outcomes of natives, and in most cases ￿nd small or no e⁄ect.
4See Chapter 1 for wage gap description.
5By ￿immigrants￿ I refer to Palestinians and foreign, guest workers in Israel. These di⁄er in some
important aspects. First, Palestinians reside in their homes in the West Bank or Gaza Strip, while foreign
workers have to live in Israel, close to their workplace. Second, Palestinians have a better channel of
communication with their Jewish employer￿ through Israeli Arabs who generally know both Hebrew and
Arabic. Also, the Arabic-Hebrew language barrier is much weaker than the foreign-Hebrew one, where
￿foreign￿ can be Chinese, Urdu, Romanian, or any other non-semitic language. Third, Palestinians are
considered ￿skilled-labor in industry,￿this generally means that they have industry-speci￿c skills￿ speci￿c
training￿ that which foreign workers do not have upon their arrival.
3e⁄ects are experienced di⁄erently by di⁄erent native groups suggesting that the degree of
substitution with native workers varies between groups. More speci￿cally, a 10% foreign-
worker-induced increase in the supply in a particular industry reduces the wage of Arabs by
about 0.8%, while having no e⁄ect on Jewish wages. A Palestinian-induced increase in the
supply in a particular industry has the opposite e⁄ect: it reduces the wage of Jewish workers
by about 0.9% but seems to increase the wage of Arabs by 2.5%.
Employment opportunities either of Arabs or Jews are not signi￿cantly a⁄ected by foreign
workers, but are harmed by Palestinian in￿ uxes (in the scale of 1.5% for Arabs and 0.5% for
Jews, for a 10% Palestinian-induced increase in the supply in a particular industry).
In terms of gaps, a simulation shows that immigration of Palestinians and foreign workers
together explain 7.6% of the (0.14 log points) increase in the wage gap between Israeli Arabs
and Jews in the 1990s (and 10.7% of the change in the wage gap in the immigrant-employing
industries). They, however, provide no explanation for the (1.7%) increase in the employment
gap￿ actually, the overall contribution is negative (￿25%) that is, the in￿ ux of immigration
would have resulted in a lower employment gap, other things being equal, rather than the
actual increasing gap observed.
The next section describes the background of this study, as regards populations involved
and sociopolitical developments in the study period. Section 2.3 describes the data used in
the study. Section 2.4 describes the theory and econometric methods used. The empirical
￿ndings are reported in Section 2.5. The intifada as an event study and robustness check
4is examined in section 2.6. Section 2.7 simulates the possible e⁄ects of immigrants on labor
market outcomes in the 1990s, and provides some predictions as to the e⁄ects on the di⁄erent
gaps. Section 2.8 concludes.
2 Background
The Israeli labor market employs Jewish workers￿ locally and foreign born; Arabs￿ locally
born, who are natives and citizens of Israel (hereafter will be referred to as ￿ Israeli-Arabs￿ );6
foreign (overseas) workers, and Palestinians￿ residents of the West Bank and Gaza Strip
(WBGS), who are not citizens of Israel.
Table 1 shows some major labor market statistics by ethnic group (nationality). While
their share in the working age population is close to that in the general population, Arabs
are much less represented in the labor force (less by 5.5%). The Arab participation rate is
only about 75% of the Jewish participation rate; however, in the prime-age, male population,
this portion is 93%￿ 97%.
6In 2005, Israeli Arabs constituted about 19.6% of the total population, Jews about 76.1%, and the rest
were either non-Arab Christians or without religion classi￿cation. See the Statistical Abstract of Israel 2006,













































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































6While exhibiting similar participation rates, in the prime-age, male population, the Arab
unemployment rate is much higher. (It was 42% higher than the Jewish unemployment
rate in 1994, and 22% higher in 2004.) As to wages, there is a stable ranking among the
labor market participant groups: Jewish workers get the highest wages, then Israeli Arabs,
Palestinians, and foreign workers.7
Palestinians were always a cheap source of unskilled labor. Mostly they were employed
in construction and agriculture. However, in the early 1990s, with the eruption of the ￿rst
Gulf war, and following some suicide bombing attacks, the government adopted a policy
of closures. Palestinians were not (easily) allowed into the country anymore. This policy
resulted in a severe shortage of labor.
About half a million Jewish immigrants, from the former Soviet Union, arrived in Israel
just in the ￿rst three years of the last decade. They were relatively very educated, with 14￿ 15
average years of schooling (Locher (2004)). The Russian immigration wave per se did not
a⁄ect outcomes of natives: Friedberg (2001) exploits information about the Russian immi-
grants￿former occupational distribution to estimate their e⁄ect on the wage and employment
of natives in occupations which employed more Russians. She ￿nds no adverse impact of
this immigration on native outcomes￿ actually, at the individual level, she ￿nds a statisti-
cally signi￿cant positive e⁄ect of this immigration wave on the wage growth of natives, and
7￿Over the years, a clear hierarchy in the strati￿cation system has been institutionalized in Israeli society
in general, and in the labor market in particular, where Ashkenazim [Western Jews] are at the top of the
socioeconomic ladder, Mizrahim [Eastern Jews] are in the middle, and the Arab citizens of Israel occupy the
bottom echelons of the socioeconomic hierarchy . . .￿p. 2, Cohen and Haberfeld (2003).
7raises the possibility of complementarity between Russians and natives. The in￿ ux of Jewish,
Russian immigrants, however, did not meet the Palestinian-induced shortage in labor.
On the one hand, these immigrants were relatively high skilled, and did not ￿nd construction￿
or any other low-skilled industry￿ to be a suitable job. That is, the immigration-driven sup-
ply shock did not meet the worker shortage.8 On the other hand, the in￿ ux of immigrants
required a rapid and substantial increase in construction employment, due to the surge in
demand for housing.
The importation of foreign workers was the solution advocated by the government and
employers, to meet the resulting worker shortage. These foreign workers came from di⁄erent
parts of the world: China, Thailand, the Philippines, Eastern Europe, and from African and
Latin American countries. Due to closures and security concerns associated with the ￿rst
(1987) and especially the second (2000) intifada, Israel began using foreign labor to replace
Palestinian workers. A foreign workforce was much cheaper than any other type of available
workforce￿ Jews, Israeli Arabs, or even Palestinians [see Susser (2004)].
According to some estimates, as in Susser (2004), the number of foreign workers reached
an unprecedented level of 300,000 workers in 2003￿ about 11.5% of the total labor force, or
25% of the prime-aged, male labor force. Starting in 2002, however, the government initiated
8This fact is pronounced in the Bank of Israel￿ s Annual Report of 1993:
". . . many of [the Russian immigrants] have not found work commensurate with their
skills. This is particularly evident when the current in￿ ux of [high-skilled, MA] immigrants is
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Figure 1: Foreign workers and Palestinians Employed in Israel, thousands
a strict deportation policy, after which the number of foreign workers started declining.
Figure 1 shows the number of foreign workers and Palestinians employed in Israel in each
quarter of the study period.
Wage and employment gaps, between Israeli Arabs and Jews, have existed as long as
wages have been measured. Nonetheless, in the last decade, the gap increased, peaking
around the year 1999, and declining thereafter. The wage gap between Israeli Arabs and
Jews increased sharply in the 1990s, from 37% in 1991 to 61% in 1999 (for males the ￿gures
9are 46% and 77%, respectively).9 These gaps, the levels and especially the rapid changes,
exceed those measured for other groups and in other countries. For example, for the same
period the male-female wage gap in Israel hovered between 15%￿ 20% most of the time.
Similar ￿gures are reported for the gender wage gap in the United States.10
The increase in wage and employment gaps was accompanied by an increase in the num-
ber of foreign workers (and, after 1995, of Palestinians) in the Israeli labor force. Standard
wage gap decompositions for the investigated period resulted in an ￿unexplained￿(or dis-
criminatory) gap of about 50% of the gross gap, and this portion was roughly stable over
the whole period.11 See Figures 2 and 3.
On the face of it, since human capital di⁄erences cannot explain about half of the existing
wage gap, labor supply shocks might have driven the gaps. This study sets out to examine
this hypothesis; more speci￿cally, it examines the link between immigrant workers and labor
market outcomes including disparities among natives, in wages and employment.12
9See previous chapter.
10See O￿ Neill (2003). The black-white wage gap was about 15-30% in the 1990s. (See Welch (2003).)
Moreover, these gaps were generally declining rather than increasing.
11See Chapter 1. There, however, I only analyze wage gaps; notwithstanding, in a follow-up investigation,
I studied the employment gaps in Israel and found roughly the same patterns.
12Mr. Beni Feferman, Chair of the Labor Force Planning Authority at the Israeli Ministry of Labor, stated
a similar concern:
" . . . in 2003, the employment of Israeli Arabs in the construction industry increased by 14% .
. . this is because the police deported a high number of foreign workers besides the continuous
closure clasped on the [Palestinian] territories . . . "
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Figure 3: Arab-Jewish Employment Gap Decomposition￿ Gross, and Unexplained Gap
123 Data
This study uses data on wages, employment￿ of Israelis, Palestinians, and foreign (overseas)
workers￿ closure days, con￿ ict events, and foreign worker permits. I describe each data type
and source in turn.
3.1 Microdata on Income and Employment
The analyses in this study are restricted to 18￿ 64 year-old, male workers. See the data
appendix (Appendix A) for the de￿nition and construction of variables and a description of
the ￿les used.
Data on income are drawn from the income surveys conducted by the Central Bureau
of Statistics (CBS) in Israel. Income surveys are based on questionnaires conducted at
the household and individual levels and cover information on demographic, personal, and
labor market characteristics. The samples include Jewish and non-Jewish respondents living
exclusively in Israel. Hence all are residents and citizens of Israel.
Detailed data on employment come from the Labor Force Surveys (LFS), also conducted
by the CBS. These are comprehensive surveys carried out on a quarterly basis; they include
detailed information about employment, occupational and industrial a¢ liation, residence,
workplace, job search, and unemployment. These data have a rotating panel format: each
respondent is interviewed four times￿ in two consecutive quarters, then, after a two-quarters
break, another two interviews in consecutive quarters. The income survey mentioned before
13is a by-product of the labor force survey: it is conducted only among the fourth (outgoing)
rotation group of the LFS. Note that foreign workers and Palestinians are not included in
the income or labor force surveys: those surveys cover only Israelis.
In this study I group individuals into industry-quarter cells. That is, I calculate the
average of the variable of interest, say the log of hourly wage, within each industry at each
quarter.13 In the data there are 15 industries￿ the ￿unknown￿ group included￿ and 56
quarters, from ￿rst quarter of 1991 to fourth quarter of 2004. Therefore, theoretically I have
840 observations for each ethnic group.14
Data on the number of employed Palestinians and foreign workers￿ coming from China,
Thailand, the Philippines, Eastern Europe (mainly Romania and Moldova), and from African
and Latin American countries￿ come from the Bank of Israel.15 These data are based on
the calculations of the CBS, the Institute of National Insurance, and Palestinian labor force
surveys. While data on the number of employed Palestinians are reasonably accurate￿ they
were collected by the Israeli CBS until 1995, when the Palestinian CBS started collecting
the data￿ the numbers of foreign workers are, in contrast, an estimate, since many of them
13One reason for this grouping is that data on immigrants￿ foreigners and Palestinians￿ and closures are
only available on a quarterly basis. Other reason for the grouping into industry is that Arab and Jewish
workers are close to perfect substitutes within industry, as I ￿nd in the next sections. If industry is a
good proxy for skill group then, assuming that immigrants and natives are perfect substitutes within skill
(industry) group, this provides a better way to estimate the e⁄ect of immigration rather than just pooling
all immigrants as homogenous input in the analyses (e.g., Card (2001); Card (2005)).
14￿Theoretically￿because, in speci￿c industries at di⁄erent quarters, it happens that we have no worker
with positive reported income. For example, in the employment analyses I have 840 observations about
Jewish workers and 836 observations about Arabs (that is only missing one year in one industry). But in
the wage analyses I have 729 Arab observations and 833 Jewish observations.
15The Bank of Israel, Data Series Database, Employed from Territories and Foreigners, Retrieved March
1, 2006 from <http://www.bankisrael.gov.il/series/en>.
14are illegally employed and thus hard to trace.16 It is estimated that, by 2003, approximately
300,000 foreign workers were employed in Israel, 65% illegally.17 Data on the distribution of
foreign and Palestinian workers across industries were obtained from the Ministry of Trade,
Industry, and Labor.18
Table 2 reports means of the main variables for men with positive income, from the
income survey, over the study period. It is clear from the table that Jewish workers are more
experienced, have more years of schooling, and are more likely to be married than Arab
workers. Also, it is evident that the hourly wage of both Arabs and Jews was increasing over
time, but that the wage gap, which was increasing in the 1990s, started declining afterwards.
While some convergence in human capital characteristics occurred between Arabs and Jews,
the gross wage gap did not follow the same path.
3.2 Con￿ ict Events
Counts of the Israeli-Palestinian con￿ ict events, as described in the media, come from the
Kansas Event Data System (KEDS). The KEDS project uses automated coding of English-
language news reports to generate political event data focusing on the Middle East and
16While most foreign workers start out with legal permits, many become illegal simply by losing or changing
jobs, or when their working visa expires.
17Ellman and Laacher (2003), p. 8.
18I thank Mr. Beni Feferman, of the Ministry of Labor and Welfare, for providing access to the data.
These data, however, are available only from 1995. For the years 1991￿ 94 I imputed the true indus-
trial distribution of foreigners in 1995 (or any speci￿c quarter of that year, or the average distribution
over 1995￿ 2004, they are all similar and results are not sensitive to this imputation). All the same,
for Palestinians in 1991￿ 94 I used data on industrial distribution from the Palestinian CBS web site,
<http://www.pcbs.gov.ps/DesktopDefault.aspx?tabID=3809&lang=en>.
15Table 2: Sample Means of Key Variables
ln(wage) Schooling Experience Married
Year Arab Jew Arab Jew Arab Jew Arab Jew
1991 3.12 3.36 9.7 12.6 17.6 21.7 0.62 0.79
1992 3.09 3.40 9.9 12.6 18.8 22.0 0.66 0.79
1993 3.00 3.33 10.1 12.8 16.3 21.3 0.62 0.78
1994 3.04 3.36 10.6 13.0 16.3 21.0 0.63 0.76
1995 3.16 3.47 10.5 13.1 17.2 20.9 0.64 0.76
1996 3.10 3.42 10.5 13.1 17.3 20.8 0.62 0.74
1997 3.10 3.48 10.6 13.2 17.8 20.7 0.67 0.74
1998 3.14 3.52 11.0 13.5 17.7 20.6 0.69 0.73
1999 3.11 3.54 11.1 13.6 17.3 20.5 0.68 0.74
2000 3.14 3.56 11.3 13.5 16.8 20.4 0.66 0.72
2001 3.23 3.62 11.7 13.6 16.6 20.4 0.68 0.73
2002 3.21 3.57 11.4 13.7 16.7 20.4 0.68 0.72
2003 3.21 3.56 11.4 13.7 16.9 20.4 0.68 0.70
2004 3.24 3.57 11.4 13.9 17.2 20.3 0.69 0.70
NOTE.￿ Source: author￿ s calculations from the income survey ￿les. Samples are
restricted to 18￿ 64 years old, working men. Reported are weighted means, using
sample weights provided by the CBS in the data.
other places in the world. These data are collected to be used in models predicting political
changes. Speci￿cally, I use the Levant Event-Type Counts Data Set.19
The events data are collected on a weekly basis. A con￿ ict event can be either verbal or
material, and this can be initiated by either Israel or Palestine. Therefore, there are four
categories of con￿ ict events. In my study I de￿ne one quarterly con￿ ict variable (hereafter
named Conflict), which is the sum of all categories of weekly con￿ ict events over a given
quarter.20
19I thank professor Philip A. Schrodt, from the department of Political Science at Kansas University, for
providing me with these data.
20Using data from B￿ Tselem￿ The Israeli Information Center for Human Rights in the Occupied Territo-
ries, I built a violence index: combining the number of Israelis and Palestinians killed in the intifadas￿events,
for each year. On a yearly basis, this is highly correlated with my ￿ con￿ ict￿variable. However, I could not
use this index in my analyses, since I have no fatalities data on a quarterly basis.
163.3 Days Under Closure
The term ￿closure￿refers to movement restrictions, on Palestinian goods and workers, which
Israel has imposed across borders and within the West Bank and Gaza Strip. Border
closures￿ between Israel and the West Bank and Israel and the Gaza Strip￿ are reinforced
by checkpoints set up along the border. Israel￿ s restrictive policy on the residents of the
occupied territories wishing to enter the country started in 1991 (Carmi (1999)). Imposing
closures every now and then, however, was mostly motivated by Palestinian bomb attacks
within Israel, or by intelligence information about such attacks.21
Data on the number of days-under-closure come from the United Nations Special Co-
ordinator for the Middle-East Peace Process (UNSCO).22 In this study I use the E⁄ec-
tive Closure Days (ECD), which refers to the actual working week. That is, ECDqy =
CCDqy ￿ 1
2Fridays ￿ Saturdays ￿ Holidays; where CCDqy is the Comprehensive (total)
Closure Days in quarter q of year y; Fridays; Saturdays; and Holidays are the counts of
those days within the quarterly CCDqy.23
21￿On 30 March 1993, in response to some of the highest levels of Arab-Jewish violence since the beginning
of the Palestinian uprising, the Israeli government sealed o⁄ the West Bank and Gaza Strip, barring 130,000
Palestinians from their jobs in Israel. The March closure was the longest ever imposed lasting into the
post-Oslo interim period . . .￿p. 312, Roy (1995).
22I used the UNSCO days-under-closure data for the years 1993￿ 2003 as presented in a study
by Aranki (2004). The recent ￿gures of 2004 are taken directly from the UNSCO web site
(www.un.org/unsco/UNSCO/statistics), accessed on 9/20/2006. It seems that the UNSCO does not have
data on closures before 1993, as it was established in June 1994 following the signing of the Oslo Accord.
Hence, for the years 1991 and 1992, I use the closure days reported in a B￿ Tselem￿ The Israeli Information
Center for Human Rights in the Occupied Territories￿ fact sheet. (See Carmi (1999).)
23In Israel, Friday is considered a half working day, Saturdays and Holidays are rest days, and Sunday
through Thursday are full working days. ECD in this example refers to the (potential) loss of actual working
days in Israel.
173.4 Foreign Worker Permits
The Ministry of Industry, Trade, and Labor (ITL), previously known as the Ministry of Labor
and Social A⁄airs, issues foreign worker permits. Those permits are issued to employers who
wish to employ foreign workers.24 The National Employment Service (ES), a division in the
Ministry of Labor, used to publish data on foreign worker permits. Now, in the ITL, the
division issuing permits and maintaining data about foreign workers is the Foreign Workers
Department. Data about foreign worker permits, that I use in this study, come from the
ES.25
4 Theory and Methodology
To understand how immigration could a⁄ect wage and employment of natives, and possibly
di⁄erently for Arab and Jewish workers, I use the theoretical model outlined in Borjas
et al. (2006) with a slight modi￿cation. The native workforce consists of Arab and Jewish
workers. These can be either employed in the formal market sector or in the home production
sector (or, alternatively, consuming leisure). Hereafter I will refer to the non-market sector
24To be legally employed in Israel, two o¢ cial documents are needed. First, the foreign worker permit,
which is issued by the Foreign Workers Department of the ITL. Second, a worker visa, which is issued
by the Ministry of the Interior. See a ￿Foreign Workers￿Rights￿ pamphlet, published by the ITL, Au-
gust 2006. Can be accessed online at: http://www.israeltrade.gov.il/NR/rdonlyres/DF7B8EC1-C998-47EE-
B087-B207645ADD93/0/English_Final_April2006.pdf
25My data about foreign worker permits, for the years 1991￿ 1995, come from Friedberg and Sauer (2003),
Table 1, p. 5. Since only annual data is reported, I had to distribute the permits evenly acrorss the quarters
in those years. I thank Sami Miaari, from the Hebrew University of Jerusalem, for helping me access the
more recent data about foreign worker permits, collected from the ES publications.
18as the home-production sector. The model assumes that workers are perfect substitutes
within industry in the formal market sector,26 and that Arabs and Jews have di⁄erent home-
production functions.27
For workers of ethnic group e (e = Arabs; Jews; denoted A and J hereafter) and industry
i; the wage in the market sector is:
wei = Xfi (1 ￿ ￿e)(Lfi)
￿f ; (1)
where Xfi is a labor demand shifter (subscript f stands for formal-market); ￿e is the discrim-
ination coe¢ cient, allowing di⁄erent wages for Arab and Jewish workers due to employer
discrimination, with ￿J = 0 and 0 < ￿A < 1￿ Jewish-Arab wage di⁄erences are determined
by the extent of employer discrimination, with wA=wJ = 1￿￿A. Lfi is the total employment
in the formal market sector in industry i, that is, Lfi = NAfi +NJfi +Pi +Fi; where Nefi is
the native employment in industry i of group e; Pi is the number of Palestinians employed
26Using the framework set in Card and Lemieux (2001), I test this hypothesis for Israeli Arab and Jewish
workers and cannot reject it at the 5% signi￿cance level. Namely, I run the regression ln(wAit=wJit) =
￿ 1
￿ ln(NAit=NJit)+￿ln("Ait="Jit); where weit is the hourly wage of group e (e = Jew; Arab) and industry
i at time t: N is the number of natives in the speci￿c group, and ￿ is the elasticity of substitution between
Arabs and Jews. "eit is a parameter measuring e¢ ciency, which I control for by including time ￿xed e⁄ects,
industry ￿xed e⁄ects, and the Arab-to-Jewish ratio of schooling and experience in each cell. The null
hypothesis of perfect substitution is that ￿1=￿ equals zero (that is, ￿ = +1). I ￿nd this to be 0:003
(standard error 0:025), failing to reject the Arab-Jewish substitution hypothesis. About ￿immigrants,￿
though, it remains an assumption, since I have no microdata about their wages and characteristics.
27These two assumptions simplify the discussion but are not essential for the results of the model. What
is essential for immigration to have di⁄erent e⁄ects on Arab and Jewish outcomes is that the groups have
di⁄erent elasticity of labor demand in the home-production sector. Also, the impact of immigration on the
accumulation of capital is ignored in this simple framework, for simplicity. Qualitatively, and as long as
capital does not adjust immediately, the results of the model are the same. See Borjas et al. (2006).
19in industry i; and Fi is the number of foreign workers employed in industry i: ￿f < 0 is the
inverse of the labor demand elasticity in the formal market sector.28
The inverse demand for labor in the home production sector (subscripted by h), is given
by:
wei = Xehi (Nehi)
￿eh ; (2)
where Xehi is a home-production demand shifter; Nehi is the number of natives, of ethnic
group e in industry i; employed in the home production sector. ￿eh is the inverse of the labor
demand elasticity in the home production sector. Note that this is assumed to be di⁄erent
for Arabs and Jews. The allocation of natives to employment in the market sector and home
production is given by:
Nei = Nefi + Nehi; 8e;i: (3)
Figure 4 shows the potential e⁄ect of an in￿ ux of migrants on labor market outcomes of
natives. The box shows the allocation of native labor between the formal and home sector.
Df is the labor demand curve in the formal sector, and Dh is the labor demand curve in
the home production sector; these are aggregated demands, equal to the sum of the demand
curves of Arabs and Jews in each sector (denoted DA
h and DJ
h; in the graph, for the home
production sector). The width of the box is the total number of natives (Arabs and Jews)
available for allocation between the formal market sector and the home production sector.
28￿Industry,￿in my analyses, is the equivalent of ￿skill-group￿(which is generally de￿ned in this literature
by schooling-experience cells, as in Borjas (2003) and Borjas et al. (2006)). This is mainly a data restriction,


























Figure 4: The Allocation of Native Labor Between the Formal Market Sector and the Home
Production Sector
21Initially the equilibrium is at point A: At this wage, W0; the number of Arabs (Jews) in
the home sector is N0
Ah (N0
Jh) (this is measured from the right). The number of Arabs (Jews)
in the formal market sector is NA ￿ N0
Ah (NJ ￿ N0
Jh). As a result of the immigrant-induced
labor supply shock, the demand for native labor decreases immediately (the curve Df shifts
down to D0
f). The new equilibrium is now at point B: Given that the width of the box is the
total native labor available for market and home (this is ￿xed and equal to NA + NJ), the
resulting decrease in the number of natives in the labor market is balanced by an increase
in natives in the home-production sector. Given a di⁄erent elasticity of labor demand in
the home sector, however, the employment of the di⁄erent groups is a⁄ected di⁄erently. In
this ￿gure, the demand in the home sector is more elastic for Arab workers, and therefore
their employment in the formal sector is more negatively a⁄ected by immigration than their
Jewish counterparts: the number of Arabs in the home sector increases from N0
Ah to N1
Ah;
while the number of Jewish workers in the home sector increases from N0
Jh to N1
Jh: It is clear
from the graph that the increase in the number of Arabs in the home sector, and thus the
decrease in their number in the formal market, is greater than their Jewish counterparts.
Equating Equations 1 and 2, linearizing the result using ￿rst-order Taylor approximation,
and solving for Lfi; we arrive at the following pre-immigration wage (See Appendix B):
lnw
￿





22where asterisks signify the pre-immigration levels of the variables, and ￿ is a positive constant






















See Appendix B for derivations of these results.
Assuming an in￿ ux of Pi Palestinians and Fi foreigners, it is easy to show that the
post-immigration wage will be:
lnwei = lnw
￿
ei + ￿f￿(fi + pi); (6)
where pi = Palestiniansi=Israelisi; and fi = Foreignersi=Israelisi; signifying the immigrant-
induced supply shock.29
Note that only the ￿reduced-form wage elasticity,￿￿f￿; is identi￿ed as a whole, and not
the factor price elasticity, ￿f: This, however, is identi￿able if we assume that immigrants
can only be employed in the formal market￿ that is, there are no unemployed immigrants;
all those who enter the country are working in the formal sector, or otherwise they would





e + he (hJ = 0; ￿￿A ￿ hA ￿ 1 ￿ ￿A) a more general equation of the post-immigration period would
be lnwei = lnw￿
ei + ￿f￿mi + d; where d = ￿ he
1￿￿e and mi = fi + pi: Note that in the actual estimation of
these equations I relax the assumption that foreigners and Palestinians have the same e⁄ect, and that Xfi
is ￿xed over time.
23not have been immigrating in the ￿rst place. This is a plausible assumption in the Israeli
context (especially about Palestinians who are never counted as ￿unemployed￿ in Israel;
they either work in Israel or are employed/unemployed in the WBGS), and therefore we
may be measuring ￿f rather than ￿f￿: Finally, it can be shown that the allocation of natives

















(fi + pi): (8)
This simple framework facilitates the analyses in that it allows di⁄erent response, of
di⁄erent native groups, to immigrant-induced labor supply shocks. This helps in estimating
the group-speci￿c e⁄ect of immigration, and therefore the possible e⁄ect of immigration on
labor market disparities.
4.1 Estimation
Let yeit be the mean value of the labor market outcome for (native) ethnic group e; in industry
i; at time t (t = q1=1991;q2=1991;:::;q4=2004). I calculate this outcome per industry-quarter
cell separately for each ethnic group (so, theoretically we have 56 ￿ 15 = 840 observations
for each ethnic group, where 56 is the number of quarter-year points in the investigated
24period, and 15 is the number of industries￿ the ￿ unknown￿category included). I then run
the following regression, by ethnic group:
yeit = ￿e + ￿epit + ￿efit + ￿0eeduceit + ￿1eexpeit + T + I + "eit (9)
where educeit and expeit are, respectively, the average years of schooling and experience of
group e in industry i at time t: T and I are vectors of ￿xed e⁄ects indicating the time
period (quarter-year) and industry from which the group is drawn. Industry ￿xed e⁄ects
are included for two reasons. First, to control for di⁄erent industry-speci￿c unobservables
that can a⁄ect the wage or employment of natives. Second, industry groups in my analyses
signify di⁄erent skill-groups, and thus including industry ￿xed e⁄ects controls for general
skill di⁄erences between the industries.30 Standard errors are clustered by industry cells.
The error term, "eit, may include, among other possible demand shifters, the term d =
￿ he
1￿￿e; which stands for possible changes in employer discrimination (see footnote number
29). Since this may be correlated with the number of Palestinians employed in Israel, in
my analyses I include the variable Conflict￿ which is a count of Israeli-Palestinian con￿ ict
events (see Data section for details), to proxy, or partially control, for this term.
Con￿ ict e⁄ects of this sort, however, are likely to vary between di⁄erent industries; for
example, the con￿ ict is less likely to a⁄ect wages in industries that employ few, or no, Arabs.
30See footnote number 28. Note that the interpretation of the coe¢ cients, when industry ￿xed e⁄ects
are included, is for the within-industry comparisons. For completeness, however, I report results for the
between-industry comparisons, when no industry ￿xed e⁄ects are included.
25Therefore, to capture this variation in e⁄ects, I interact the variable Conflict with industry
￿xed e⁄ects and run the following regression:31
yeit = ￿e + ￿epit + ￿efit + ￿0eeduceit + ￿1eexpeit + T + I + I ￿ Conflictt + "eit (10)
I examine the e⁄ect of immigration on two distinct labor market outcomes: wages, and
employment. Thus, yeit represents either the log of hourly wage, or a measure of employment.
I consider two measures of employment. First, the ￿employment rate,￿which is de￿ned by
the fraction of weeks worked during the year.32 The labor force questionnaire asks about
the number of weeks (or months, as of 1994) worked last year; therefore, I use the question
for the following year in this year￿ s regression. That is, yeit = ERei;t+4; where EReit is the
fraction of weeks (months) worked last year￿ number of weeks (months) worked divided by
52 (12). Alternatively, I use the current employment status as a measure of the employment
level; that is, EMeit is equal to the number of employed natives (in ethnic group e; industry
i; and time t cell) divided by the native population in this cell.33 I use a linear probability
model to estimate the e⁄ect of immigration on the employment of natives.34
Wage and employment regressions are estimated by weighted least squares￿ where, unless
31Technically, Conflict main e⁄ects will be captured by the time ￿xed e⁄ects, since Conflict varies only
with time. Thus, its e⁄ect has to be viewed within, rather than between, industries.
32Employment rate is de￿ned similarly in Borjas et al. (2006).
33This is simply the employment rate as it is customarily de￿ned in labor economics.
34Qualitatively I get similar results if I estimate employment equations by minimum Chi-square method
(grouped logit estimator), when using the right weights in this FGLS type of estimator. Namely, instead of
simply using the cell size n; we use n ^ E(1 ￿ ^ E); where ^ E is the predicted employment rate, calculated from
an unweighted ￿rst stage regression of log odds ratio on the variables of interest.
26otherwise stated, weights are the number of observations used to calculate the dependent
variable in each industry-quarter cell. These dependent variables are calculated from the
microdata on employment and income using CBS-provided individual sampling weights.35
4.2 Instrumental Variables Approach
The decision to immigrate for work is likely to be related to the economic situation in the
destination country. This, in turn, is manifested in better employment opportunities and
higher wages.36 Therefore, the portion of Palestinians and foreign workers in the Israeli
workforce (variables pit and fit in Equations 9 and 10) may be endogenous; estimating
Equations 9 and 10 by OLS, therefore, may result in biased estimators for the main e⁄ects
of interest.
Using days-under-closure as an instrument for the portion of Palestinians and worker-
permits as an instrument for the portion of foreign workers, I estimate the main equations
by two-stage-least-squares.
4.2.1 Days Under Closure
Days under closure constitutes a source of independent variation in the number of Palestini-
ans employed in Israel. The number of days under closure is signi￿cantly, and negatively,
related to the portion of Palestinians employed in Israel. This variable is dictated by secu-
35Regularly I found no big di⁄erence between the weighted and non-weighted estimates of the second stage.
36See Angrist (1996) for a description and estimation of a two-economies model, where Palestinians￿choice
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Figure 5: Days Under Closure and Total Con￿ ict Events
rity considerations regardless of the labor market conditions. Since Palestinian workers have
huge di¢ culties arriving at their Israeli workplaces when a closure is imposed, the number of
days under closure is a good candidate instrument for the portion of Palestinians employed
in Israel. Broadly speaking, a closure is imposed in response to some attack or con￿ ict event,
which itself may a⁄ect the labor demand in Israel or the supply of Palestinians, so I control
for Conflict in my analyses besides using the closure days as an instrument. Figure 5 plots
the days under closure data along with the con￿ ict data. A positive relation is clear; also,
the intifada incident of September 2000 is apparent in both series of data.
In industry-by-industry regressions which are not shown, of wage on days under closure
28and time ￿xed e⁄ects, I ￿nd that the coe¢ cient on closures is not signi￿cant in industries
which do not employ Palestinians, such as banking, education, and health. This is good
evidence in favor of the exclusion restrictions, because it suggests that the only channel of
correlation between closures and Israeli wages is through the entry of Palestinians.
I performed another validity check of the instrument, to see whether days under closure
have an e⁄ect on, or are correlated with, the economic situation in Israel. I regressed the
composite state-of-the-economy index (which is a synthetic cyclical indicator for examining
the direction of real economic activity), on days-under-closure and year and quarter ￿xed
e⁄ects.37 I found no statistically signi￿cant relation between days under closure and the state-
of-the-economy index. More speci￿cally, the coe¢ cient on closures, if anything, is expected
to be negative, but I found it to be insigni￿cantly positive in this regression: 0.0136 with a
standard error of 0.0144 (R2 = 0:995; N = 56).
Figures 6￿ 8 show the Palestinians-to-Israelis ratio (pit) and the days under closure, in
di⁄erent industries. (Each data point in these graphs is a quarter-year cell.) A negative
relationship is apparent from the ￿gures in each industry. The lines in these graphs plot the
￿tted values from an OLS regression of the Palestinians-to-Israelis ratio on E⁄ective Closure
Days. These yield coe¢ cients of -0.003, -0.0003, and -0.007 in the agriculture, manufacturing,
and construction industry, respectively; with R2 of 0.272, 0.225, and 0.261. The correlation
37The composite state-of-the-economy index is calculated monthly by the Bank of Israel. The index,















Figure 6: Palestinians-to-Israelis Ratio and Days Under Closure￿ Agriculture
coe¢ cient between pit and e⁄ective-closure-days (ECDt) is -0.52, -0.47, and -0.51.
4.2.2 Foreign Worker Permits
Foreign worker permits are used as an instrument for the number of foreign workers in Israel.
This variable is highly, and positively, correlated with the number (ratio) of foreigners in
the Israeli workforce, making it a relevant instrument. The availability of illegal foreign
workers and unused permits preclude this from being perfectly correlated with the number






































Figure 8: Palestinians-to-Israelis Ratio and Days Under Closure￿ Construction
32ine¢ ciencies in the issuance of permits dissociates it from unobserved or unmodelled current
wage and employment determinants. Due to this institutional friction, the worker-permits
variable makes a good candidate instrument.38
In industry-by-industry reduced form regressions, of wages against worker permits (and
time ￿xed e⁄ects), I found that the coe¢ cient on worker-permits is generally not signi￿cant
in industries which do not employ immigrants. This suggests that the exclusion restrictions￿
that the only channel of correlation between worker permits and Israeli wages is through the
entry of foreign workers￿ is reasonable.
Moreover, to see whether the number of foreign worker permits is correlated with the
economic state of the country, I regressed the composite state-of-the-economy index (see
previous section) on worker permits and year and quarter ￿xed e⁄ects. I found no statisti-
cally signi￿cant relation between worker permits and the state-of-the-economy index. More
speci￿cally, the coe¢ cient on permits is not signi￿cantly di⁄erent from zero, it is 0.0042 with
a standard error of 0.0294 (R2 = 0:994; N = 56).
Finally, while it is possible that worker permits are issued in response to changes in labor
demand, evidence does not support this hypothesis. If it, nevertheless, were true we would
expect the wage to increase when worker permits, and thus foreign workers, increase; in
the Results section, however, we will see that wages actually decrease with foreign workers.
38Friedberg and Sauer (2003) use this variable in estimating the e⁄ect of foreigners on Palestinians, and
provide a similar argument as to its validity. (A more recent version of the paper (June, 2004) is available
from:
<http://www.mnb.hu/Resource.aspx?ResourceID=mnb￿le&resourcename=sauer4>).
33Second, examining the intifada, where in one quarter the number of Palestinians employed
in Israel dropped by 84,000 workers, the contemporaneous increase in worker permits was
only 6,800 (from 72,600 to 79,400)￿ and foreign workers increased by 6,500, from 204,500 to
211,000. Even in subsequent quarters the increase in worker permits was never above 10,000,
and in 2002 this started declining. This suggests that worker permits cannot respond quickly
to economic conditions.
Figures 9￿ 11 show the foreigners-to-Israelis ratio (fit) and the number of foreign worker
permits issued in di⁄erent industries. Lines are the ￿tted OLS values from running fit on
permits, with coe¢ cients of 0.005, 0.00009, and 0.005 in agriculture, manufacturing, and
construction industry, respectively; with R2 of 0.653, 0.732, and 0.615. The correlation
coe¢ cient between fit and permits is 0.81, 0.86, and 0.78, respectively.
5 Estimation Results
Table 3 reports the underlying ￿rst-stage regressions for Palestinian and foreign workers used
in the study. The omitted category is banking. The explanatory variables in these regressions
include average schooling and experience in each industry, 56 time ￿xed e⁄ects, 15 industry
￿xed e⁄ects, all the instruments (closure days and worker permits) and the instruments
interacted with industry ￿xed e⁄ects, and, in the richer speci￿cation, the Conflict variable
and Conflict interacted with industry ￿xed e⁄ects.
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Figure 11: Foreign-Workers-to-Israelis Ratio and Worker Permits￿ Construction
37Table 3: First Stage Regressions
Palestinians Foreign Workers
Variable Coe¢ cient SE Coe¢ cient SE
Closure 0.49 0.395 0.89 1.892
Closure￿Agriculture -1.94*** 0.600 -1.39 2.875
Closure￿Manufacturing -0.31 0.379 -0.05 1.817
Closure￿Electricity 0.04 0.575 -0.09 2.760
Closure￿Construction -3.72*** 0.410 -2.43 1.966
Closure￿Vehicles -0.21 0.396 -0.03 1.897
Closure￿Accommodation -0.99** 0.464 -2.23 2.226
Closure￿Transport -0.13 0.415 -0.03 1.990
Closure￿Real Estate 0.06 0.400 -1.12 1.918
Closure￿Public Administration -0.01 0.412 -0.12 1.974
Closure￿Education 0.01 0.431 -0.08 2.066
Closure￿Health 0.02 0.456 -0.15 2.189
Closure￿Community -0.06 0.467 -0.18 2.240
Closure￿Domestic Personnel 0.07 1.137 30.62*** 5.454
Closure￿Unknown -0.26 0.474 -0.08 2.273
Permits 0.00 0.234 -0.63 1.122
Permits￿Agriculture 0.28 0.394 4.93*** 1.890
Permits￿Manufacturing 0.00 0.225 0.12 1.079
Permits￿Electricity 0.01 0.346 0.01 1.658
Permits￿Construction -4.02*** 0.245 4.48*** 1.176
Permits￿Vehicles 0.05 0.236 0.37 1.132
Permits￿Accommodation 0.01 0.298 5.97*** 1.429
Permits￿Transport -0.04 0.251 0.04 1.204
Permits￿Real Estate 0.01 0.254 1.88 1.217
Permits￿Public Administration -0.01 0.249 0.02 1.195
Permits￿Education -0.02 0.260 -0.01 1.246
Permits￿Health -0.05 0.276 0.03 1.326
Permits￿Community -0.21 0.295 0.77 1.413
Permits￿Domestic Personnel -0.02 0.669 67.65*** 3.208
Permits￿Unknown 0.08 0.510 0.28 2.445
R2 .9137 .8356
NOTE.￿ * p<10%, ** p<5%, *** p<1%. Dependent variable for Palestinians (Foreign
Workers) is pit (fit), which is the Palestinians- (Foreigners-) to-Israelis ratio in industry i at
time t. Independent variables are: days under closure, closure￿industry interaction terms,
permits, permits ￿ industry interaction terms, time ￿xed e⁄ects, industry ￿xed e⁄ects,
average schooling in industry, average experience in industry, and Conflict ￿ Industry
interaction terms. Coe¢ cients (and standard errors) are multiplied by 1000, for ease of
exposition.
38number of days under closure. Also, the portion of foreign workers is generally positively
related to the number of foreign worker permits. High R2 (.84￿ .91) is an evidence for strong
instruments. The strength of the ￿rst stage is more pronounced in the ￿immigrant-abundant￿
industries; and, in these industries, the e⁄ect is very precisely estimated. Finally, both the
e⁄ect of closure on foreign workers and the e⁄ect of worker permits on Palestinians are not
always statistically di⁄erent from zero.
Table 4 reports the main ￿ndings of this study, concerning the e⁄ect of di⁄erent types
of immigrants on wages of native groups. Foreign workers seem to have negative e⁄ects
on the wages of Arabs.39 The wage of Jewish workers is virtually una⁄ected by foreign
workers. Palestinians, nonetheless, while a⁄ecting Jewish workers negatively have a positive
e⁄ect on the wage of Arabs. Two possible, not mutually exclusive, explanations for this
result are possible. First, Israeli Arabs may bene￿t from the entry of Palestinians into
some industries, because they may be promoted￿ within that industry￿ to a position of
supervising Palestinian workers, given their better knowledge of Hebrew (and Arabic). Also
Israeli Arabs have a clear advantage in transporting Palestinians from border areas to their
workplaces in Israel.40 Second, it may be the case that Arab workers who are crowded out
39Note that columns labeled (1) (OLS or IV) in the table do not include industry ￿xed e⁄ects, thus measure
the overall, not the within-industry, e⁄ect of immigration.
40Theory is found to support this hypothesis. Findlay and Lundahl (1987) show how white workers, in
the Apartheid South African economy, can bene￿t from the entry of black workers, even if that entry lowers
their marginal productivity. So long as there are restrictions on the mobility of blacks, their wage will be
lower than their marginal product, and white workers￿ having ￿ license to import￿black workers￿ will reap
a ￿ premium￿on each black worker entering the economy. The premium is equal to the di⁄erence between
the marginal product of labor and the wage at the blacks￿hometown (the ￿Bantustan￿ ). The setting in our
context is very similar, since the stylized facts are that: Israeli Arabs may be needed for every Palestinian
hired to work in Israel￿ for help in communication and transportation from border areas to the Israeli
39Table 4: E⁄ect of Immigration on Wages
OLS IV
(1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3)


















































Time FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry FE No Yes Yes No Yes Yes
Con￿ ict￿Industry No No Yes No No Yes
R2 (Arab) .726 .826 .830 .725 .822 .829
R2 (Jewish) .610 .878 .884 .608 .877 .884
NOTE.￿ * p<10%, ** p<5%, *** p<1%.
a p = Palestinians=Israelis, f = Foreigners=Israelis. FE stands for ￿Fixed E⁄ects.￿ Dependent
variable is the average ln(wage) in each industry-quarter cell. Other independent variables are the
average of schooling and the average of experience in each industry-quarter cell, for each ethnic group.
Regressions are run separately for each ethnic group, thus, each column represents two regressions,
one for Arabs and one for Jews. There are 729 Arab industry-quarter cells (observations), and 833
Jewish industry-quarter cells (observations). Regressions are weighted least squares, where weights
are the number of observations used to calculate the dependent variable in each cell. Standard errors
are in parentheses, and they are adjusted for clustering within industry cells.
from the industry by the entry of Palestinians are less skilled, thus leaving the highly skilled
workers in that particular industry raising the average wage of Arabs.
Analyses at the individual level do not lend support to the selective withdrawal hypoth-
esis. That is, using individual data and controlling for a multitude of worker characteristics
(such as schooling, experience, squared experience, marital status (￿ve categories), type of
locality, and period of immigration, beside other variables used in the grouped data analyses
such as con￿ ict, and time and industry ￿xed e⁄ects), I ￿nd the coe¢ cient on p for Arabs
workplaces; and, on the other hand, Palestinians never have free access to the Israeli labor market￿ and this
restriction on their movement keeps their wage much lower than that of other parties in the labor market.
40to be positive and signi￿cant: 0.236 (standard error 0.053). Had the selective withdrawal
hypothesis been the sole explanation for our results, controlling for a wide set of individ-
ual characteristics￿ and thus partially for self selection￿ would have resulted in a negative
coe¢ cient, which is clearly not the case here.
Furthermore, I directly compare the average ￿quality￿of the Arab workers before and
after the intifada. If there is negative self-selection, then we would expect the quality of Arab
workers to decline after the intifada, when less skilled Arabs join the labor market to substi-
tute for the lost Palestinians. I de￿ne quality as the weighted average of the characteristics￿
schooling, experience, experience squared, and marital status￿ of Arab workers, where for
weights I take the Arab (or Jewish) coe¢ cients from a general wage equation run for the
whole period of the study. I ￿nd that there is no signi￿cant change in the quality of Arab
workers after the intifada, and, if anything, it increases slightly.41 This result is in favor of
a complementarity explanation for the positive e⁄ect of Palestinians on Israeli Arab wages
found earlier.
Tables 5 and 6 report results of the employment regressions. In Table 5 the dependent
variable is the ￿employment rate,￿de￿ned as the portion of weeks worked last year. Since
the regressors are of the current year, I calculate the relevant employment rate from the
following year￿ s survey. In Table 6 the dependent variable is the average employment in the
41Using Arab wage coe¢ cients the ￿quality￿of Arabs increase from 0.940 in the ￿rst three quarters of
2000 to 0.953 in the ￿rst three quarters of 2001. Using Jewish wage coe¢ cients this increases from 0.863 to
0.876 (the exact change as before). I get similar results when comparing the quarter right before the intifada
(quarter 3/2000) with the quarter right after the intifada (quarter 4/2000), and these are 0.953-0.955, and
0.875-0.878 when using the Arab and Jewish wage coe¢ cients, respectively.
41Table 5: The E⁄ect of Immigration on the Employment Rate of Natives
OLS IV
(1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3)


















































Time FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry FE No Yes Yes No Yes Yes
Con￿ ict￿Industry No No Yes No No Yes
R2 (Arab) .508 .997 .997 .506 .997 .997
R2 (Jewish) .684 .999 .999 .682 .999 .999
NOTE.￿ * p<10%, ** p<5%, *** p<1%.
a p = Palestinians=Israelis, f = Foreigners=Israelis. Dependent variable is the average em-
ployment rate in each industry-quarter cell. Employment rate is de￿ned by the number of weeks
(months) worked during the year divided by 52 (12). See text for details. Other independent vari-
ables are the average of schooling and the average of experience in each industry-quarter cell, for
each ethnic group. Regressions are run separately for each ethnic group, thus, each column repre-
sents two regressions, one for Arabs and one for Jews. There are 776 Arab industry-quarter cells
(observations), and 780 Jewish industry-quarter cells (observations). Regressions are weighted least
squares, where weights are the number of observations used to calculate the dependent variable in
each cell. Standard errors are in parentheses, and they are adjusted for clustering within industry
cells.
particular industry-quarter cell. This is the portion of people employed from the whole pool
of natives in that cell. These tables are based on calculations from the labor force data￿ thus,
they are di⁄erent from data used in the wage analyses which come from the income survey.
See the data section for details.
Results from these tables (5 and 6) are very similar. Palestinians seem to crowd out both
Arabs and Jews. The e⁄ect of foreign workers on the employment opportunities of natives is
not always signi￿cantly di⁄erent from zero; this could be because it is possible that permits
42Table 6: The E⁄ect of Immigration on the Employment of Natives
OLS IV
(1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3)


















































Time FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry FE No Yes Yes No Yes Yes
Con￿ ict￿Industry No No Yes No No Yes
R2 (Arab) .491 .996 .996 .489 .996 .996
R2 (Jewish) .073 .999 .999 .072 .999 .999
NOTE.￿ * p<10%, ** p<5%, *** p<1%.
a p = Palestinians=Israelis, f = Foreigners=Israelis. Dependent variable is the probability of
being employed (average employment in an industry-quarter cell). Other independent variables are
the average of schooling and the average of experience in each industry-quarter cell, for each eth-
nic group. Regressions are run separately for each ethnic group, thus, each column represents two
regressions, one for Arabs and one for Jews. There are 836 Arab industry-quarter cells (observa-
tions), and 840 Jewish industry-quarter cells (observations). Regressions are weighted least squares,
where weights are the number of observations used to calculate the dependent variable in each cell.
Standard errors are in parentheses, and they are adjusted for clustering within industry cells.
43increase when demand shifts out, but the decrease in Arab wages suggests that this is not the
explanation. Foreign-worker-induced supply shocks, therefore, do not seem to be explaining
changes in employment gaps among natives.
5.1 Alternative Explanations
It is possible that, when restrictions are imposed on the movement of Palestinian workers,
those are also imposed on the movements of goods. Thus, exports from Israel to the Pales-
tinian territories may decrease with the number of Palestinian workers.42 If this is true
for industries which employ Israeli Arabs, then, when Palestinians are barred from entering
the country, the demand for these workers may decrease as well, resulting in lower wages
for Arabs, even in the absence of complementarity between Israeli Arabs and Palestinian
workers.
Although it is a possible explanation for the observed positive relation between Palestini-
ans and the wage of Israeli Arabs, the evidence does not support this alternative explanation.
First, using CBS ￿gures about total exports from Israel to the WBGS, I estimate the main
wage equations with the exports, interacted with industry, added as a regressor. The results
are only slightly a⁄ected, and the positive relation between Arab wages and the portion of
Palestinians is maintained. In a new regression which includes exports to WBGS interacted
42Using the 56 quarters at hand, I ￿nd that the correlation coe¢ cient between total exports to the
Palestinian territories and the (aggregate) number of Palestinians employed in Israel is 0.136. A positive but
small coe¢ cient.
44with industry ￿xed e⁄ects, I still ￿nd a positive and signi￿cant e⁄ect of Palestinians on the
wage of Israeli Arabs￿ more speci￿cally, the analogous Arab coe¢ cient on p to that (.205)
found in ￿rst row, column (3) of Table 4 is now 0.154 (Pv.<0.01).43 All other speci￿cations
yield similar results.
Approached di⁄erently, if restrictions on Palestinian movement a⁄ect wages by decreasing
Israeli exports (to the WBGS), then there will be no Israeli Arab wages in industries which
produce non-tradable goods. Therefore, I estimate the main wage equations in a subsample
which includes only non-tradables and services: construction, accommodation services, real
estate and business activities, and domestic personnel in private households. Despite a
much smaller sample, the coe¢ cient on p (Palestinians/Israelis ratio) for Arabs is 0.141
(with standard error of .0827).44 This evidence is at odds with the exports explanation.
Finally, an exports explanation implies that the employment rate of Arabs should increase
when there are more Palestinians employed in Israel. Previous tables (such as Table 5 and
6) show that the employment rate of Arabs, within industry, decreases with the increase of
Palestinians in that industry, in contrast to what the exports explanation would predict.
43The coe¢ cient for Jewish workers is now a statistically signi￿cant -.054 (as compared to the insigni￿cant
-.041 from second row, column 3 of Table 4.
44These regressions include year ￿xed e⁄ects (rather than t ￿xed e⁄ects), average experience, average
schooling, con￿ ict interacted with industry ￿xed e⁄ects. The coe¢ cient on p for Jewish workers is -.020 and
not signi￿cant (standard error is 0.054).
456 The Intifada as a Natural Experiment
The second intifada (referring to the Palestinian uprising against the Israeli occupation)
started on September 30, 2000 (the ￿rst intifada started in 1987). That is exactly the last
day of the third quarter of the year 2000.45 As a result of the intifada, and in less than a
couple of months, the number of Palestinian workers in Israel dropped dramatically, from
121,000 workers in the end of the third quarter of 2000, to about 37,000 workers in the next
(fourth) quarter of 2000 (a drop of 84,000 workers, which is about 6.9% of the Israeli, male
workforce).46
This dramatic change in the number of Palestinian workers, a result of political tension,
constitutes a natural experiment￿ where the number of ￿immigrants￿changes exogenously,
and for reasons clearly outside the labor market. In the previous section I ￿nd di⁄erent e⁄ects
of Palestinians and foreign workers using an instrumental variables approach. The intifada
event study allows us to see the e⁄ect of Palestinians not confounded by that of foreign
workers￿ between the third and fourth quarter of 2000 the number of foreign workers, which
was on the rise during that period, only increased by 7,000 workers (a 3% increase). Hence,
the before-after comparison allows us to safely assume the number of foreign workers to be
45This is important because my data are quarterly, and therefore I have data on the labor market right
before and right after the intifada.
46In his seminal paper, Card (1990), studies a very similar ￿natural experiment.￿The Mariel Boatlift of
1980, investigated by Card, increased the Miami labor force by 7% in less than four months. Card (1990)
found virtually no e⁄ect of this immigration wave on the wages or unemployment rates of less-skilled workers.
The intifada in this paper is a ￿reverse boatlift,￿in that the number of immigrants dropped (rather than
increased) sharply.
46roughly constant, and thus associate any e⁄ects on the labor market with the lost Palestinian
workers.47 I run the following regression:
yje = ￿e + Xje￿e + ￿0eINT + ￿1ePAL + ￿2eINT ￿ PAL + uje (11)
where yje is the outcome variable (ln(wage) or dummy for employment status￿ 1 if employed,
and zero otherwise) of individual j of ethnic group e. The regressions use individual data,
and control for marital status, type of locality, schooling, experience, squared-experience,
and period of immigration.48 INT in these regressions is a categorical variable which takes
on the value 1 if the individual is observed after the intifada and 0 otherwise, PAL is a cat-
egorical variable which takes on the value 1 if the individual is employed in an industry that
typically employs Palestinians, and 0 otherwise. The ￿treatment￿is the intifada (resulting
in the huge drop of Palestinian workers), and the ￿treated￿are workers who are likely to
be a⁄ected by the treatment, namely, workers in industries which employ Palestinians￿ and
thus experienced a loss in workers. Those industries are labeled PAL; and include: agri-
culture, construction, manufacturing, vehicles repair and maintenance, accommodation and
restaurants, business services, transport, and personal and social services.
Table 7 presents di⁄erence-in-di⁄erences estimates of the e⁄ect of Palestinians on labor
47Other comparison period that I make is grouping the ￿rst, second, and third quarter of 2000 (this is the
before-treatment group) and the ￿rst, second, and third quarter of 2001 (the after-treatment group). The
fourth quarter of 2000￿ where the intifada started and was at its peak￿ being skipped. These time periods
grouped are comparable in terms of seasonality, facilitating the estimation of the e⁄ect.
48Control for period of immigration is only in the wage equation.
47market outcomes of Israeli Arabs and Jews.49 The intifada has a statistically signi￿cant
negative e⁄ect on the wages of Arabs only. Industries that employ Palestinians have generally
lower wages￿ and more so for Arabs. But Jewish workers, employed in these industries, seem
to bene￿t more from the intifada-induced shortage of Palestinians (the net e⁄ect on their
wage is 0:049 (=.057-.008) as opposed to 0.026 for Arabs, in the ￿rst set of periods of
comparison). The Di⁄erence-in-Di⁄erence-in-Di⁄erences (DDD) estimate is 0:026￿0:049 =
￿0:023; that is, Arab wages, in the immigrant-employing industries, are harmed, relative to
Jewish wages, by the exit of Palestinians (due to the intifada). In the 3/00-4/00 comparison
(column (2) of the table) the ￿gures are 0.026 for Jews and 0.003 for Arabs, therefore the
DDD estimate is exactly ￿0:023, equal to that from column (1).
To see how this estimate compares to previous results, consider the estimates from column
(3) of Table 4. The DDD estimate of the e⁄ect of p (Palestinians-Israelis ratio) is then:
0:246 ￿ (￿0:090) = 0:336 (increase in lnwage of Arabs relative to Jews, for a one unit
increase in p). The DDD estimate of ￿0:023 from Table 7 is associated with a decrease (due
to the intifada) in p from 118:5=986:7 = 0:120 before the intifada to 46:8=973:1 = 0:048
after the intifada, a decrease of 0:072. Therefore, the relative e⁄ect of a one unit increase in
p on lnwage is: ￿0:023
￿0:072 = 0:319; which is very similar, in sign and magnitude, to the 0:336
estimate mentioned above (which is based on Table 4).
49Column (1) of the table uses data from the ￿rst three quarters of 2000 and the ￿rst three quarters of
2001; column (2) uses only the quarter before the intifada (q3/2000) and the quarter directly after it started
(q4/2000). See table notes for more details.
48Table 7: The E⁄ect of Palestinians￿ intifada￿ on Employment and Wages of Natives
(1) (2)


























R2 .382 .331 .347 .326


























R2 .506 .462 .501 .468
N 11545 45531 3911 15429
NOTE.￿ * p<10%, ** p<5%, *** p<1%. Column (1) is based on
data from quarters 1, 2, and 3 of 2000 and quarters 1, 2, and 3 of
2001. Column (2) is based on data from quarter 3-2000 (just before
the intifada) and quarter 4-2000 (just after the intifada started). The
variable INT takes on the value 1 if the individual is observed after
the intifada, that is, starting from quarter 4 of 2000. PAL takes on
the value 1 if the individual is employed in industry which employs
Palestinians￿ such as construction, agriculture, manufacturing, etc.
(see text for details). Dependent variable in Wage is ln(wage), and
in Employment is employment status (1 if fully or partially employed
and 0 if unemployed or not in the labor force). Other independent
variables are: marital status, years of schooling, experience, experience
squared, type of locality, period of immigration. Standard errors are
in parentheses.
49The evidence presented by this exercise supports the hypothesis of complementarity be-
tween Palestinians and Israeli Arabs. Finally, employment opportunities, after the intifada,
are better in general￿ and more so for Arabs. However, the evidence is somewhat incon-
clusive about the e⁄ect of Palestinians on Arab employment. The DDD estimate in column
(1) is 0:024, implying that Arabs are more likely to be employed in immigrant-abundant
industries after the loss of Palestinian workers (intifada). The DDD estimate from column
(2), nonetheless, is ￿0:008; meaning the employability of Arabs is una⁄ected by the intifada.
Hence, the e⁄ect is either zero or positive.
7 Simulation: Accounting for the Trend Gap in Wages
and Employment Between Israeli-Arabs and Jews
As a starting point, I measure the actual di⁄erence in the wage and employment gap between
the years 1991 and 1999, by industry. Industries are grouped into two types: industries that
do not employ immigrants, and those in which immigrants are employed (that is, industries
i for which fit + pit > 0 for some t). The overall e⁄ect of immigration is roughly measured
by a simple comparison between changes in the gap. Table 8 provides the di⁄erence-in-
di⁄erences estimates. The wage gap in the immigrant-employing industries increased by
0.112 log points more than the wage gap in other non-immigrant industries. This may
suggest that immigration had a bigger negative e⁄ect on the wages of Arabs. The two
50Table 8: Overall E⁄ect of Immigration on the Wage and Employment Gap
Di⁄erence in the Gap=Gap99 ￿ Gap91
Type of Industry: ln(wage) Employment Employment Rate
Employing Immigrants :2020 0:0110 0:0276
No Immigrants :0902 0:0146 0:0312
Di⁄erence :1118 ￿:0036 ￿:0036
NOTE.￿ Reported are actual changes in the wage, employment, and employment rate
gaps, between the years 1999 and 1991. Wage and employment gaps are calculated using
sample weights provided by CBS in the data. Changes in wage gaps are calculated from
the income surveys, and changes in employment gaps are calculated using the labor force
survey ￿les. Samples include men, aged 18￿ 64 only. Industries, in our samples, that do
not employ either Palestinians or foreigners are: Electricity, Health, Education, Banking,
Public Administration, and the ￿unkonwn￿cateogry.
measures of employment yielded identical results as to the overall e⁄ect of immigration, and
the e⁄ect, while slightly negative, is not signi￿cantly di⁄erent from zero. Therefore, we would
expect that immigration explained part of the diverging wage gap, but none of the change
in the employment gap.
To more precisely estimate the e⁄ect of immigration-induced supply shocks on the wage
gap among natives, I use the IV coe¢ cients reported in model (3) of Table 4, and simulate
the impact of the Palestinian and foreign worker in￿ uxes of the 1990s. I compare changes in
the wage gap between 1991 and 1999, by industry. The predicted change in ethnic group e0s
wages in industry i, due to changes in the portion of foreigners and Palestinians, other things
equal, according to Equation 9, is: dyei = ￿edpi + ￿edfi; e = Arab;Jewish: Therefore, the
change in the wage gap between two time periods, say 1991 and 1999, due to immigration
is given by (y99
J ￿ y99
A ) ￿ (y91
J ￿ y91
J ) or, rearranged, dyJ ￿ dyA; which can be written as:

















51Table 9: Wage Gap Simulation 1991/1999
Change in (log) wage Gap 91/99
Predict by Immigrant Workers Explained by
Actual Palestinians Foreigners Total Immigration
Agriculture -.112 -.024 .043 .018 -16.3%
Manufacturing .251 -.006 .001 -.005 -2.0%
Construction .366 .050 .041 .091 25.0%
Vehicles repair -.050 -.005 .004 -.00004 0.1%
Accommodation-Rest. .103 -.004 .055 .051 49.8%
Transportation .209 .007 0 .007 3.2%
Business Activities .251 .001 .022 .023 9.3%
Community/Other .174 .008 .006 .014 8.2%
Private households -.784 0 .365 .365 -46.5%
Other Industries .090 0 0 0 0
NOTE.￿ The simulation compares the year 1991 to 1999. The actual change in the wage gap is
simply the di⁄erence between the wage gap in 1999 and the wage gap in 1991, calculated separately
for each industry. Estimates for the simulation are taken from column IV(3) of Table 4. The
predicted change in the wage gap is decomposed into two components: the e⁄ect of Palestinians
(￿J ￿ ￿A) ￿
￿
p99 ￿ p91￿
, and the e⁄ect of foreign workers (￿J ￿ ￿A) ￿
￿
f99 ￿ f91￿
. Last column is
simply the total predicted change in the gap over the actual change in the gap.
I then calculated the predicted changes in the gaps within each industry, according to
Equation 12, and the actual change in the gap. The portion of the change in the wage gap
which is explained by immigration is de￿ned by the fraction of the predicted change over
the actual change. Table 9 reports the results of this simulation. First, it is evident from the
table that immigration explains a good portion of the change in wage gaps in construction
and in the accommodation-restaurants industries. These industries employ immigrants more
than average.50
Immigration, however, does not explain much of the change in the wage gaps in agricul-
50The ￿private households (with domestic personnel)￿is reported just for completeness. However, it is
clear that results here are erroneous. This becomes clear when we know that in 1991, in our income survey
sample, there was only one Arab who reported working in this industry with positive income (and when
weighted by sample weights this translates to 48 Arabs from the whole country). So, it does not make much
sense to calculate wage gap within this cell, for that year. It is truly said that this industry is whole-foreigners,
since no Palestinians, and almost no Israelis, are employed in this industry.
52ture and manufacturing; this is surprising, given that the ratio of foreigners in this industry
increased from 0.03 in 1991 to 0.53 in 1999 (similar to the change in the construction indus-
try). The decline in the wage gap in agriculture may be the reason for that, since it goes in
the opposite direction to most other industries. It is also clear that we cannot expect immi-
gration to explain changes in wage gaps in industries that do not employ immigrants￿ those
were grouped together in the bottom line of the table. The gross wage gap increased by 0.09
log point in these industries, while the portion of foreigners or Palestinians employed here
remained zero.
To see how much of the overall change in the wage gap is explained by immigrants, I
weighted the predicted change in each industry by the average distribution of industries in
1991 and 1999. Then I divided that by the weighted actual change in the gap. I found that
immigration could explain only 7.6% of the overall change in the wage gap. And, if other
industries are excluded, immigration could explain about 10.7% of the total change in wage
gap in the immigrant-employing industries.51
Table 10 reports results for the employment gap simulation (using average employment
rather than the employment rate). The overall picture is that immigration provide no ex-
planation for the change in employment gaps. The overall average in immigrant-employing
industries is about ￿25%; that is, using our estimated coe¢ cients the employment gap would
have been expected to decrease, but in reality it increased.
51Other industries are electricity, banking, public administration, education, and health.
53Table 10: Employment Gap Simulation 1991/1999
Change in Average Employment 91/99
Predict by Immigrant Workers Explained by
Actual Palestinians Foreigners Total Immigration
Agriculture .021 .005 -.008 -.004 -18.0%
Manufacturing .002 .001 .000 .001 55.3%
Construction .067 -.010 -.008 -.018 -26.7%
Vehicles repair -.034 .001 -.001 .000 0.0%
Accommodation-Rest. -.084 .001 -.011 -.010 12.0%
Transportation -.026 -.001 0 -.001 5.1%
Business Activities .068 .000 -.004 -.005 -6.8%
Community/Other .057 -.002 -.001 -.003 -4.9%
Private households -.021 0 -.072 -.072 351.9%
Other Industries .015 0 0 0 0
NOTE.￿ The simulation compares the year 1991 to 1999. The actual change in the employment
gap is simply the di⁄erence between the employment gap in 1999 and the employment gap in 1991,
calculated separately for each industry. Estimates for the simulation are taken from column IV(2) of
Table 6. The predicted change in the employment gap is decomposed into two components: the e⁄ect
of Palestinians (￿J ￿ ￿A) ￿
￿
p99 ￿ p91￿




Last column is simply the total predicted change in the gap over the actual change in the gap.
8 Concluding Remarks
The second intifada provides a natural experiment for the study of the e⁄ect of immigration
on labor market outcomes of natives. I exploit this and other recurring labor supply shocks
due to border closures to measure the e⁄ect of immigration, of Palestinians and foreign
workers, on the wage and employment of Israeli Arabs and Jews. The study uses Israeli
microdata drawn from labor force and income surveys for the years 1991￿ 2004, to answer
questions about the e⁄ect of immigration on the Israeli labor market.
A contribution relative to the previous literature is that I examine the e⁄ects of di⁄erent
types of immigrants, some of whom are substitutes for the disadvantaged group in the labor
market (Israeli Arabs) and the other of whom are complements. I also examine the direct
54e⁄ect of immigration on labor market disparities between Israeli Arabs and Jews.
While immigration is found to have some interesting e⁄ects on di⁄erent native groups, it
could only explain a small portion of the increasing wage gap, and none of the employment
gap. The study ￿nds that immigration can explain about 7.6% of the overall change in the
wage gap (although it could explain up to 50% of the change in the wage gap within spe-
ci￿c industries such as the accommodation-restaurants industry), and it has no explanatory
power for the overall change in the employment gap, although within some industries it could
explain some of the diverging employment gap (as in the manufacturing industry, for exam-
ple). This leaves unsolved the puzzle of the diverging gaps of the 1990s. Put di⁄erently, it is
likely that we would have witnessed the same divergence in labor market outcomes between
Israeli Arab and Jewish workers, even if there had been no Palestinian or foreign workers
in￿ ux in the 1990s.
I ￿nd that immigrants had a signi￿cant e⁄ect on labor market outcomes of natives, and
that e⁄ects on employment and wages di⁄er in important ways. More importantly, the e⁄ects
of immigration vary depending on who the immigrants are, and what natives one examines.
More speci￿cally, a 10% Palestinian-induced increase in the supply in a particular industry
decreases the hourly wage of Jewish workers by about 0.9%, but increases the hourly wage
of Arab workers by about 2.5% in that industry; the employment rate of Jewish workers
decreases by 0.5% and that of Arab workers decreases by 1.5%. A 10% Foreign-workers-
induced increase in the supply in a particular industry decreases the wage of Arabs by 0.8%
55in that industry, but does not a⁄ect the wages of Jewish workers, neither does it a⁄ect the
employment rate of either Arab or Jewish workers.
(Chapter head:)
A Data
In 1995 the Arab sample within the income survey was extended to include Arabs in urban
localities with population of 2,000-10,000. (Only urban localities are included in the income
survey.) This has no e⁄ect on the results and the variables￿ that is, a jump in the variables of
interest is not noticed around this year, and CBS sample weights ensures equal representation
of the subgroups, not altered by the extension of the sample.
Since 1997 income has been calculated based on a combined sample of the income survey
and the survey of family expenditures. This resulted in income samples double in size￿
with no apparent e⁄ect on our results, given that I use the CBS-provided sample weights
everywhere in the analyses. (Kibbutzim, institutions, and groups of Bedouins living outside
localities are still absent from the income surveys, even in the new design.)52
Worker￿ s hourly wage is calculated by dividing monthly income by the product of hours
worked per week and working weeks per month. I deal with outliers, in terms of hourly wage,
by dropping observations below the ￿rst and above the ninety-ninth percentile of the hourly
52The dataset for the year 1997, serving as the linking year, has been produced in two versions pertaining
to the old and new sample design. Sample weights, provided in the data ￿les by CBS, serve to make statistical
inference comparable over the years.
56wage distribution for each year. This procedure is more robust and meaningful than dropping
observations on an a priori imposed currency cuto⁄point, since the analyses involve di⁄erent
years, from 1991 to 2004, over which the currency value is not comparable. Moreover, this
procedure accommodates changes in the wage distribution over the period years.53
I control for the period of arrival to Israel of permanent Jewish immigrants (from the
former Soviet Union and other countries). Not all the income surveys provide exact year of
immigration, thus I control for period of immigration￿ rather than the exact year￿ that is,
immigration in the 1980s versus the 1990s.54
B Equilibrium Wage and Employment Derivation
Equating Equations 1 and 2 yields the following:
Nehi =
￿





fi = g (xei;Lfi) (13)
53See Chandra (2000), where he explains and uses this procedure.
54In this study I treat foreign and Palestinian workers as ￿ immigrants.￿ I do not investigate the e⁄ect of
the Russian immigration wave (1990￿ 1993) on the labor market. Those enter my analyses as Jewish workers,
with ￿ foreign-born￿dummy. (For the e⁄ects of the early Russian immigration see Friedberg (2001).)
57where xei =
Xfi(1￿￿e)

























































= ￿ei + ￿eLfi (14)
















Recall that Lfi = NAfi +NJfi; and Ne = Nef +Neh; e = A;J: Also, Nf =
PI
i=1 Lfi; and
thus ￿ Lf = ￿ Nf: Using the linear approximation in 14, Lfi is de￿ned as
Lfi = (NAi ￿ NAhi) + (NJi ￿ NJhi) =
= NAi + NJi ￿ ￿Ai ￿ ￿Ji ￿ (￿A + ￿J)Lfi; (15)
and thus:
Lfi =
NAi + NJi ￿ ￿Ai ￿ ￿Ji
1 + ￿A + ￿J
: (16)
Recall that g￿
e (xei;Lfi) = ￿ Neh (e = A;J). Using the point of pre-immigration averages
as the arbitrary point, and using the de￿nitions of ￿ and ￿ as above, Lfi can be expressed








￿ xe; ￿ Lf
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fi; where asterisks here refer to the pre-
immigration values of the variables.
58as:
Lfi = ￿i + ￿(NAi + NJi) (17)











Finally, taking log of both sides from Equation 1, and plugging Lfi from 17, we get
ln(w
￿
ei) = ln[(1 ￿ ￿e)Xfi] + ￿f ln(￿i + ￿(NAi + NJi)) (19)
which is Equation 4 from the main text.￿
The employment equations are obtained straightforwardly from taking the log of equation
13 and plugging Lfi from 17.
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